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A CRISIS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING* 
Reflections on the 2 5th Anniversary of the 
Christian Peace Conference 
by Detlef Urban 
Detlef Urban (Lutheran) , Dipl . Pol . , born in 195 3 ,  
studi ed  Political Science and Philosophy at the 
Freie Universitat Berl in (West) . He i s  editor of the 
Evangelische Pressedienst ( epd) , a news agency of 
th e Evangel ische Kirche , and editor of KIRCHE IM 
SJZI ALISMUS , a bi-monthly j ournal on problems of 
church and society in the G erman Democratic Repub­
l i c , published by Wichern Verlag , Berl in (West ) . His 
publ ications include: "Kirchen treten an die Offent­
l i chkeit , "  in R .  Henk ys , Die Evangelischen Kirchen 
in der DDR (Munich , 1982)  ; "Jugend ohne Bekenntnis? 
30 Haj re Jugendweihe und Konfirmation im anderen 
Deutschland 1954-84 "  (Berl in ,  1984) . He has also 
published reports about problems of GDR and Eastern 
Europe in broadcasting and maga zines . 
The Beginnings 
The Chri stian Peace Conference (CPC) wa s founded in Prague in 1958 
alnost exactl y thirty years after the large assembly organized by the 
World Council for International Fri endship Work of Churches had taken 
place in Prague in August 1 9 28 . For the 1 928 World Conference,  500 
delega tes had come to P rague in order to discus s the ways in which the 
churches might take on and further their mission of peace . The World 
Council for International Friendship Work of Churches,  founded in 
Konstan z at the time of the outbreak of World War I in 191 4 ,  was the 
fi rst international ecumenical organization. Already seven years earl ier ,  
r epresentatives of dif ferent churches had met for preparatory dis cus­
si ons. I nterdenaninational cooperation wa s establ i shed as the working 
principle and incl uded in the resolution passed at the time of its 
founda tion . Di etrich Bonhoef fe r ,  youth secretary of the World Council for 
International F riendship Work of Churches ,  emphasized and broadened this 
idea in hi s speech at Fane in 193.4 and sugge sted the establ ishment of an 
internationa l Christian peace council . 
*Translated from German. Detlef Urban, "Von Anfangan in einer Kri se , " in 
Kirche im Socialismus , Vol . 9 ,  No 6 ( 1 98 3 ) , pp . 9-26 , by permission of 
the publ isher.  A sl ightl y shortened version . 
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Three years later ,  the World Church Conf er ence in Oxford dec ided to 
establish an int ernationa l body which would coord ina te ec umen ical 
cooperation , th e Wor ld Council of Ch urch es (WCC ) . Due to th eo log ical 
differenc es , the World Council for Int ernational Friendship Work of 
Church es did not part ic ipate in the pr eparatory work . At the fo undat ion 
of the WCC ,  it was dec ided to disso lve the World Council in 1948 � 3 
Jos eph L .  Hromadka , together with Bohus lav Pospis il, one of the 
fo und ing fathers of th e CP C, a lso partic ipated at th e 1928 peace 
conferenc e. From the point of v iew of today ' s  CPC , its fo undation had 
be com e  necessa ry b ecaus e the dissolut ion of the World Council had created 
a gap for the international ecumen ical peace work of church es which could 
no t be f illed by the wee, espe cia lly s inc e its committees soon came und er 
the political pres s ures created by the Co ld Wa r.  
On the fourth and fifth of October 195 7 ,  theo log ians of the Comenius 
School of Theo logy of the Ch urch of the Cz ech Brethren (Prag ue) and the 
Slovak L utheran School of Th eology met at Madra near Bratis lava. As . 
Professor Hromadka summa riz ed it , they att empted to dea l  in th eo logical 
terms with problems posed by the historica l s ituation as well as with n ew 
dev elopments.  The participants in the conference felt strongly that the 
po litic a l  cha llenge creat ed by n uc lear wea pons necessitat ed an uneq uivo­
ca l theo logical pos ition . However ,  this would not suffic e. The f inal 
resolut ion passed at th e conf erence made c lear what wa s needed : The 
strugg le aga inst the nuc lear threat would have to become the task of the 
whole ch urch and peace ef forts wo uld have to become an ec um en ica l task . 5 
In Dec ember a meet ing of 2 00 part ic ipants from Cz echoslovak ch urch es 
took p lace. It dea lt with the topic " Th e  Struggle aga inst N uc lear Arms as 
Task of the Christians and the Ch urch es . "  The Cz echos lovak Ec umen ical 
Co unc il wa s charged with th e organ izat ion of a World Congr ess of 
r epres entat ives of Christian church es irrespective of na tionality and 
denominat ion for the year 1958 . 
Th es e efforts resulted in th e so-ca lled Ist Chr istian P eace 
Conferenc e in Prag ue a few rocmths lat er (June 1-4 , 1 9 58 ) . A lmost 40 
ind ivid ua ls , mostly from East ern E uropean countries , the G erman Fed eral 
Rep ubl ic and the G erman Democrat ic Republic , participat ed in th is 
meeting . Among the participants wer e s uch well-known ind ivid ua ls as 
Hans-Joa chim !wand , Professor of Th eo logy from Bonn , and H einr ich Vogel, 
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theo logian from Berlin ,  both of whom pres ented a report . 
At the First Christian P eac e Conf er ence, Jos eph Hromadka described 
the f ut ure tasks as follows : 
We are gathered h ere, theolog ians and repr es enta­
t iv es of churches ,  in order to rev iew our theo logy , 
in order to revis e  our th eolog ical and ethical 
standards and in order to examine wheth er or not o ur 
th eology is rooted in th e spiritua l depth of the 
prophets and the apos tles or �heth er it has not 
be can e a type of human ideo logy .  
Th e f irst Prag ue confer enc e concluded with a messag e to Chr istian ity 
ca lling for the creation of nuc lear-fr ee zones , the ban and destruct ion 
of a ll wea pons of mass destr uction , and a meet ing of lead ing stat esmen.  
For the contin uat ion of work , a "Contin uation Committ ee" was fo unded 
who se tasks inc luded th e pr eparat ion of th e IInd Ch rist ian P eace 
Conferenc e. 
Th e  IInd Conf er ence took p lace within the year (April 16 -1 9 ,  1 959) ; 
on e year lat er ,  the IIIrd Christ ian P eac e Conference took plac e. The 
numb er of part icipants ros e to one hundred ,  then to two hundr ed . 
Up to 195 9 ,  the off icial church organizat ions in the West had rather 
r efra in ed from contacts with the CPC . On ly delegat es from the Evang elical 
Ch urch es of G ermany who wer e in Prag ue upon invitat ion of th e Ecumenica l 
Counc il of the Churches of Cz echos lovak ia in it iated contacts : Praes es 
Joachim B eckmann of th e Evang elica l Church of the Rhin eland and Pra es es 
Ernst Wilm of the Evangelical Church of Westphalia were the highest 
rank ing r epr es entat ives . Lat er on, both demonstrated th eir sympathy for 
the CPC .  For may years , Pra es es W ilm worked actively in the organization . 
From the church es of the GDR , de j ure s till a part of th e Evangelica l 
Churches of G ermany , the Evang elical L uth eran Church of Thur ing ia sent 
Oberk ir ch enrat G erhard Lotz a s  off icial repr es entat ive for the Landes­
bis chof Mor itz M itz enh eim. 
Th e  G erman church es wer e st ill r eluctant and the L utheran Kirchenamt 
is s ued th eir conc ern with r egard to the CPC in a circ ular because, 
altho ugh a contrib ut ion to the ma intenanc e of peace by th e church es was 
r egarded as nec essary , a linkage of th eo logical princ iples and political 
- 19 -
in terests (a reproach a lso ad dr essed to the Broth erhoods ) wa s described 
as not permiss ible. However , this attitude was not rigoro us ly upheld on 
th e int ernational lev el and the World Counci l of Church es ,  the World 
Allianc e of Reformed Chur ches , the L uth eran World Federa tion and the 
Co nference of E uropean Church es s ent officia l repr esentatives to Prag ue. 
The lind and IIIrd Conferenc es again devoted thems elves to the 
urgent questions of th eo logy , weapons of mass destruction and the 
problems bro ught abo ut by the Co ld War .  S uch early organizational 
st ructur es as the P ermanent Working Committee, the Contin uation Com­
mittee, and a Preparatory Committee for the pr eparation of a gen eral 
Christian peace conf er enc e in 1961 wer e elected at th e lind Conf er enc e in 
order to guarant ee th e continuity of the work . 
Th e  Is t A ll Chri stian P eace Ass embly (ACPA )  took plac e Jun e  13-18 , 
196 1 ,  under the motto " .  . . and P eace on Earth . "  Almost seven h undred 
participants attend ed the confer enc e. For the first time, repr esentatives 
of African churches att ended , a t endency whi ch was to contin ue lat er on 
a nd conf irm the ori entation toward the Third World . 
At the Ist ACPA , the CPC rec eived an organizational structure. A 
Working Commi ttee (WC) consisting of 25 individua ls was elected and 
cha rg ed with the organization of r egiona l confer enc es until the next 
ACPA ,  and to formulat e the tasks for the t en pe rmament commi ttees whi ch 
were to be established . The formation of an int ernationa l s ecretariat was 
a lso part of the Working Committ ee' s task . 
The " (Advis ing ) Committ ee for the Contin uation of Work" (A) CCW 
[ abbr . CCW , th e ed . J consi sting of 120 persons was established 
s pecifically for s ubstantive q uestions . 
According to th e statut e of the CPC , the Working Commi ttee was the 
c entral body which , apart fr om the tasks described above, det ermined the 
d ep uty pr esident of the CPC and nominated the chairperson of the CCW . The 
m embers of the Financial Committ ee, its chairperson and secretary , had to 
be nomi nated by the ccw. On ly the two top positions,  that of the 
pres i dent of the OCW and that of the genera l s ecretary who had to direct 
th e int ernational secr etariat , wer e dir ectly nominat ed by the gen eral 
assembly , the ACPA. Jos eph Hromadka became the first pres ident , Jaros lav 
7 Ondra , a mi nister ,  the first genera l secretary . 
The radica l th eo logical and ethical positions of the earli er con-
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ferences showed themse lves especially in the working gro up on " Disarma­
me nt" of the All-Chri stian Assembly . In its report , the gro up had 
designed the following steps toward disarmament : 
1 .  Stop n uc lear testing d ue to its genetic consequences; 
2 .  Ban of the production of weapons of mass destruction ; 
3 .  Establi shment of certain nuc lear-free zones ; 
4 .  Conc lusion of an internationa l treaty on general, tota l and con­
trolled disarmament ; 
5 .  Abo lition of a ll existing weapons down to the minimum necessary 
to s afeg uard public order ;  
6 .  Abo lition of a ll we apons and armi es B 
7 .  Abo lition of a ll mi litary treaties. 
A special committee a lso dea lt with the German question and its con­
nection to the nuc lear bui ld-up and the we and ccw put this item on their 
agenda . 
In the publication Christian Peace Conference , the official quar­
terly of the CPC ( a long with CPC-information bulletin published at 
ir reg ular intervals) , President Hromadka published his "Memorand um on the 
German q uestion " (No . 4/196 3 ) . In this memorandum, he suggested that 
Western policies wanted to turn the Federa l Rep ublic of Germany into an 
economic,  mi litary and dip lomatic "bridgehead " against the Warsaw Pact 
co untri es and he continued : 
The distrus t  toward and the resistance against the 
Eastern E uropean developnent toward socia lism a re 
more the conseq uences of an irrationa l mood than a 
respons ible and po litical strugg le for the f ut ure. 
The f ut ure wi ll show whether G erman churches,  in 
spite of a ll the j ustif ied criticism , wi ll develop 
at least a sympatheti c understanding of the Eastern 
E uropean co�ribution to history and its sociali st 
de vel opnent . 
In spite of the domi nation of Eastern E uropean church representa­
tives a nd the prox imity to the po licies of the socia list co untries , the 
CPC co uld sti ll af ford dissent in its own organization . The speeches by 
Vogel or Go llwitze r ,  whose ethics were not limited by ideo logies , or the 
Si n o-Soviet conf lict (wi th hesitant support of the Chinese position) 
could not be kept o ut of the discussions without the loss of the 
ec umenica l  credibi lity of the CPC . 
In their attempt to dea l  with churches in East and West,  the CPC 
could not afford to antagonize the Evangelical Ch urches of Germany as it 
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was done by CPC-members in the GDR and organizations c los ely related to 
th e CPC such as the Federation of Protestant Ministers in th e GDR. Walt er 
U lbricht att empted to deepen th e de facto s eparation of the GDR church es 
from the Evangelical Church es of G ermany fo llowing th e construction of 
the Berlin Wa ll in 1 96 1  by ca lling for a positive " co llaboration of 
Christians and Marxists . "  Th ereby he att empted to make th e church es of 
the individual provinc es of the GDR legal entiti es and partners . 
Considerations conc erning a "ch urch in socia lism" wer e discus sed on a 
broad lev el in the church administration as early as 196 4 .  However ,  a 
j uri dica l separation of the GDR church es from the Evang elica l Church es of 
G ermany was not even remotely considered . A partisan attitude in this 
question wou ld have had consequences for the position on th e G erman 
question as a who le. On the oth er hand , in order not to antagoniz e t he 
Evangelica l Church es of G ermany , th e CPC had to restrain its elf with 
r egard to the G erman q uestion , in spite of its unequivocal position in 
thi s  respect. In thi s light, we have to interpr et Hromadka 1 s position 
taken in the co urse of the IInd ACPA in Prague at a press conference: 
We have no right not to recogniz e th e unity of th e 
ch urch . We, as the Christian peac e movement , have no 
busin ess1Bot to recognize the Evangelical Church of G ermany . 
H:romadka 1 s memo randum conc erning G ermany was adopted as a position 
paper for the work of the commission "Peace and the German Q uestion . "  The 
resu lts of the work of thi s commi ssion ,  which f urther clarified thi s 
position (thes es of Bas el) also became the basis for the Committ ee 5 of 
th e IInd ACPA ( Jun e 28 -Ju ly 3 ,  196 4) . Two hundr ed of approximat ely 90 0 
participants were inc luded in this committ ee. The results of its work , 
howev er , had to be withdrawn due to strong i nt ernal dissent . 
Mart in Ni emo ller , especia lly ,  criticiz ed the thesis of the recogni­
ti on of both G erman states and insisted on shared responsibi lity by the 
alli es as agr eed on at the Potsdam Conferenc e, a stand which especially 
th e delega t es from the Russian-Orthodox Church opposed . According to 
Ni emCi l ler , it was impos s ible to request , or even force the Federal 
Republic of G ermany to recognize th e GDR. 
Th e exis t enc e of two G erman stat es for as long as we 
are witho ut a peace treaty , remains an open q ues­
ti on. Neith er the G erman Federal Republic nor the 
German Democratic Republic is a stat e, but both a re 
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colonies of superpowers not yet reconc il ed with each 
ot her.  
Oth er members of th e W est G erman Reg ional Committee equally attempt­
ed to demonstrate that the question of G erman un ity was not yet solved .  
N iem0l ler ' s  pos it ion wa s s ign if icant in its impl icat ions as it pr esented 
the CPC with the d ifficult question wheth er or not coex istence includes 
bl oc sol idarity and consol idat ion of blocs--or wh eth er the lead ing powers 
in ea ch bloc should not rath er renounc e  their bloc pos ition and f ind a 
G erman solut ion in accordance with th e spirit and mandat e  of the Pot sdam 
trea ty .  
Aft er a GDR repr es entat ive had expl ained his historical view of th e 
c ause of the s eparation of G ermany , the committ ee threat ened to break 
apart and the members of th e West G erman del ega t ion , who had left out of 
protes t ,  could only be persuaded to rej o in the meet ing due to the 
withdrawa l of the pos it ion paper.  Th e  f inal result of the discussions was 
an account ment ioning both pos itions . 11 
Th e el ection of the ccw also showed the necess ity to tolerate 
r elevant minorit ies . D el egat es of the F ederal Republ ic of Germany for 
this body included , among others , Martin N iemoller ,  Pra es es Ernst W ilm , 
Ob erkirch enrat H einz Kloppenburg , Professors H einr ich Vog el and H elmut 
Gol lwi tz er ,  B ishop Friedrich Wunderl ich as wel l as Martin Stobr and 
Joa chim Kan it z ,  both min ister s .  
At the IInd G en eral Assembl y ,  two important organ izat ional changes 
were introdu c ed .  The work ing committee was increased numerically and the 
number of commi s s ions s et up by the work ing committee was reduced from 
twelve to f ive: the Theological Commis s ion , the Int ernational Commis s ion , 
P eace and th e Ecumen ism , P eace and the Probl ems of New Countries ,  P eace 
Work among Young P eopl e. It is important to note that the commiss ions on 
"P eace and Cold War , "  "P eace and Freedom , "  and "Peace and the G erman 
Question " no l onger ex is t ed  in their narrow substantive form . 
Th e  committ ee on "P eace and th e Roman Catho l ic Church" was also dis­
solved as a "permanent commis s ion . "  This is closely related to the change 
of th e pos it ion towards th e Roman Catholic Church which had been 
crit ici z ed  at the Ist ACPA in 1 96 1  because it supposedly supported the 
Co ld W ar spirit. Th is crit icism wa s off ic ially withdrawn at the IInd ACPA 
in which Cathol ic obs ervers and guests partic ipat ed :  "At that t ime we d id 
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not have faith enough in th e works of the Ho ly Spirit within the catho lic 
Church . "  A lr eady at a CCW meeting in June 1963 , Pope John XXI I I ' S  
encyc lical "Pac em in Terri s"  was acknowledged d ue to its decided 
commitment towards peace and the ren unciation of the fri end-and-foe 
12 pattern. Of co ur s e, no official cooperation with th e Catho lic Church 
en s ued .  However , the CPC dev eloped c lose ties to the B erlin Conference of 
( East) E uropean Catho lics whi ch is actua lly an organization working 
parallel to the CPC. 
Towards the Open Break 
Th e  contradictions that had developed so far as well as potentia lly 
explosive i s s ues whi ch had not yet res ult ed in controver sies could on ly 
be contained in one common framework for as long as th e obj ective 
political conditions in the socia li st countries and the subj ective 
abi lity of leading CPC persona liti es made the beginnings of a discours e 
poss ible. The fai lure to di fferentiate b etween these two factors ,  as is 
freq uently don e  by Western 13 observers, ov erlooks , for examp le, that 
churches in the socia li st GDR have much more elbowroom than , say , those 
of th e CS SR wh ere a mi nister is actua lly a stat e employ ee. Also, for eign 
and s ec urity po lici es in socia list co untri es are strict ly a monopo ly of 
th e stat e. 
Ev en if , in t erms of a llianc es ,  it s eemed t emporari ly opportun e  to 
set up a transnationa l o rganization which ess entially r epres ented the 
po int of view of the socialist co untri es, there a lways remained a 
som ewhat unknown q uant ity . Socia list countri es always expected int er­
na tional ec umenica l r elations to pursue a para llel form of diplomacy with 
th e West . This was true also for the foundation of the CPC which was 
looked at with som e s uspicion and distrust by the stat e organs.  And even 
if t oday ' s  CPC is a ca lc ulable and reliable organization for the 
socia list co untri es , its activiti es in th e int ernationa l arena (EEC , 
member of UNESCD , accreditation as Non-Governmental Organization at the 
United Nat ions) still suggest a c ertain amo unt of unreliabi lity . 
According to state officia ls , the events fo llowing 1 968 showed that 
th ere wer e contradi ctions in the CPC whi ch could not be overcome and 
these were considered dangero us for their own power ba se. However ,  1 968 
also showed that it wa s wrong to eq uat e the CPC with the polici es purs ued 
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by the governments in spite of the many affinities that may have existed 
up to that time. Leading persona lities in Prag ue ,  especia lly President 
Jos eph Hromadka , had succeeded in keeping the organizati on an integral 
who le . 
In 196 8 ,  the I IIrd A ll-Chri stian Peace As sembly took p lace litera lly 
in the midst of the "Prag ue Spring . "  The participation of Third World 
co untri es was even stronger than at previous conferences . The virulent 
q uestion for the international po litica l disc ussion ,  solidarity with the 
pe ople s  and nations fighting for independence ,  had a lasting effect on 
the theo logical and political orientation of the CPC . A lready in 1965 , 
th e CCW had formulated the "struggle aga inst imperia li sm" as a strategic 
task a nd  in 1966 it dea lt with the q uestion of solidarity with Vietnam 
and rej ec ted " a ll forms of colonia lism, neocolonialism and racism" ( later 
on , thi s  was a lso done by ch urch representatives participating at the 
confe rence " Ch urch and Society " whi ch took p lace at Geneva) . 
Especia lly the revo lutionary strugg le of liberation movements 
aga inst So uth Ameri can di ctatorships and the " liberation theo logy " 
developed in Latin America led to an inq uiry by Christians from the se 
co untri es to the Theologi cal commi s sion of the CPC . The q uestion was 
whi ch position Ch ri stians sho uld take with regard to the use of vio lence 
in revolutionary actions.  The commi s sion maintained that in ana logy to 
the concept of a " j ust war" he ld by medieva l theo logians , there is a lso a 
" j us t  revo lution" in the course of whi ch Ch ristians could resort to 
revo lutionary use of force in a responsible manner . 
A look back at thi s I IIrd ACPA a lso stresses other reasons for the 
significance of this conference which represented a certain " c limax " :  
It s s uccess mus t be valued even higher , as it suc­
ceeded against a number of participants from 
capita li st co untri es who had attempted to use the 
CPC as a platform for undermining and inf i ltrating 
churches in socialist countri es and to lead the CPC 
away from the line established by its stat utes and 
it s earlier reso lutions . Thi s confrontation within 
the CPC contin ued after the I I Ird ACPA . Event ually ,  
it led to a po lari zation and fina lly to the 
separation from those forces whi�h stood not on t he 
ba sis of the statut e  of the CPC . 
This historical view from the year 1 980 comes from a leading member of 
th e CPC, theologian Gerhard Bas sarak from East Berlin, one of the 
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vic e-presidents of the CPC . H e  i s  known as a passionate en emy of Western 
anti-communi sm and of the Cold War . Howev er , he oft en s eems stuck in that 
peri od hims elf and us es his historica l j udgment in a highly s elective 
way . Hi s attacks ( " undermining and infi ltrating " )  ar e ideo logical 
formulations at the v ery least c los ely r elat ed to the phi losophy of state 
security organs of thes e  countri es . 
Th e severi ty of thi s j udgment may a lso be owing to the fact that it 
appeared in th e Theo logica l L exicon p ublished by "Union , "  the p ubli shing 
ho us e  of the (East G erman) Chri stian Democratic Party . In a different 
situation, Prof . Bassarak proved less rigoro us in his j udgment , a lthough 
it wa s j ust as di storting . In a vo lum e  entitled The Christian Peace 
Conferenc� edit ed by him in 1 981 , h e  wrot e  on the "History of the CPC " :  
Som e participants who had come to Prag ue and to the 
CPC were not so much g uided by th eir desire for 
pe ace. Rather ,  th ey expected s ensations in vi ew of 
the social instabi lity of Cz echos lovakia in 1 968 . 
Th ese expectations wer e not f ulfi lled . The G en eral 
Ass embly did not swerve from the basic course which 
th e roov ement had fo llowed sinc e its foundation. 
Sti ll today ,  the reso lutions of the IIIrd ACPA m ust 
be counw among th e most remarkable statem ents of 
th e CPC . 
Furtherroore, Bassarak accus es the "di ssidents" of having attempted 
to "steer the roovement away from its goa ls" a lready prior to 1 968 . 
In stead of dea ling with q uestions of peace, they had aimed at confronting 
"dif ferent ' forms ' of socia lism . "  They had tried to t urn the CPC in to a 
conf er ence on "Chri stian" socialism ,  but the CPC had s uccessf ully warded 
off these att empt s ,  " a lthough this res ulted in the disconti n uation of the 
di r ect cooperation of som e  individ uals.  However , there was no feeling of 
hostility towards those who no longer participated . "  It remains up to 
B as sarak to explain how hi s claim that ther e  wa s no hosti lity match es hi s 
acc usation of infi ltration made at the same time. In light of his 
st atement that differ ent politica l  views should not be caus e for division 
as the b eli ef in Ch rist whi ch is common to a ll req uires the brotherhood 
and sist erhood of a ll beli evers can only be taken as an appea l for 
"peac ef ul coexistenc e" on the ideo logica l level. 
It sho uld b e  noted that the selective hi stori cal pr es entation by the 
vic e-pres ident of the CPC was made in th e rec ent past , saying that 
" Socia lism cannot become the bus iness of an exc lusive gro up . " Th ereby 
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Bassarak defended the rigoro us course of the CPC after 1 968 . B ut thi s ,  of 
course,  wa s  exactly the concern of the "di ssidents . "  They did not want to 
accept the politica l pres sures following the invasion of 1968 based on 
the Kremlin' s c laim that they had the exclus ive right for the 
inte rpretation of soqialism. This pre s s ure was exerted even on an 
international Prag ue-based organization such as the CPC and forced 
Jaroslav Ondra,  then genera l secretary of the CPC , to resign as a result 
of hi s activities in the Prag ue Spri ng . The conseq uence was not on ly a 
cris i s  within the CPC groups in the West and between the Western groups 
and the new leadership under Metropolitan Nikodim but also the 
resignation of President Hromadka who remained loyal to his general 
se cretary . Hromadka died a year later . 
Prague 1968 and the Consequences for the CPC 
It i s  poss ible to take a less offensive position toward one ' s  own 
hi story than Bas sarak has done. S uch a "neut ral" position , however , may 
prove to be no les s  s e lective in the e nd .  The book Voices for 
Disarmament : 25 Years of the Christian Peace Conference publi shed in 
16 Prag ue on the occasion of the 2 5th anniversary may serve as an examp le . 
Of the "remarkable statements" made at the I IIrd ACPA mentioned by 
Bas sarak , i t  contains on ly a report of the Working Gro up B ( Internationa l 
Problems) . This report a lso hints at the controversial positions ,  but 
there are no other comments on the conseq uences of 196 8 .  The compi lation 
of oocuments for this vo lume as a who le , however ,  sugges ts that this 
attempt at reconci liation (whi ch for the no st part should not be conf used 
with an attempt to come to terms with one ' s  historical problems ) with 
those who had been expe lled , was part of the policy of the CPC leadership 
under the present President, H unga rian Bishop Karo ly T6th . This is 
confirmed by the fa ct that at the celebration commemorating the 
anniversary , the diss idents were invited and given an opportunity to 
speak for the first time since the cri sis of 196 8 .  
I n  the report of the above-mentioned Working Gro up B of the I IIrd 
ACPA (March , 3 1-Apri 1 5 ,  1 96 8 )  the fo llowing two problem areas were 
disc us s ed : 1 )  the q uestion of the treaty on the ban of nuc lear arms ; and 
2) the q uestion of a securi ty sys tem for E urope . 
The q uestion of non-proliferation had become topica l at internation-
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al negotiations since not only the superpowers but a lso Great B ritain, 
Fra nce and Chi na had acquir ed nuclear weapons . As long as the USSR and 
the u . s .  were the exc lusive owners of the se wea pons , it was e asy for 
Chri stians i n  Europe to rej ect nuc lear arms on theological and ethi cal 
grou nds. As we have seen in the case of the Brotherhoods in Germa ny ,  the 
di fficulties arose at the poi nt where the stationi ng of or even the power 
of disposal over such weapo ns became a national political problem. This 
required politica l opposition on ethi cal grounds . 
Additionally ,  one of the basic questions was whether the inter­
na tional constellation of power shou ld be reenforced through a further 
consolidation · of the blocs a nd a mutual military threat . Certain 
countries (France , Chi na) did not wa nt to renounce their right to �oduce 
nuc lear weapons of their own ( Artic le 2 of the Nuc lear Arms Ban Treaty) 
be caus e they were afraid that such a renunciation wou ld weake n their 
national sovereignty a nd a lso the i nternationa l  balance of forces . Thus 
they did not sign the treaty . Simi lar concerns were also expressed at the 
II Ird ACPA : 
Some participants [ of Group B ,  the author ] expressed 
their fear that this draft only reaffirmed the 
ba lance of powe r but not the ba la nce of obligatio n. 
Thus it cou ld only be accepted if comprehensive 
me asures of disarmament were take n at the same time . 
Otherwi se the non-nuc lear powers wou ld be at a 
di sadva ntage and remain without protection. Other 
members of this group, however ,  held the view that 
the non-pro life ration treaty wa s a step forward . It 
represented a prerequisite for further steps on 
detente and disarmament .  Treaties on a step-by-step 
nuc lear disarmament of the nuc lear powers wou ld have 
to fo llow , but these measures should not 1 ;>e a 
precondition for the non-pro liferation treaty . 
Hromadka ' s  Theology : The Search for a P lace i n  Socialism 
At a meeting of the We st Berli n Regiona l Committee Helmut Go llwitzer 
stressed that the governments that had changed the politica l situation by 
mi litary force were respons ible for the resignation of the general 
secretary . He emphasized that 
so far these governments had tolerated a nd supported 
the work of the CPC a lthough they had to k now that 
the CPC wou ld not follow a one-sided pro-Soviet li ne 
a nd that it provi� an opportunity for free 
po litica l discus sion. 
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The developnent within the CPC also proved those Western critics 
wrong who had identif i ed  the CPC and Jos eph Hromadka with soviet 
com:rm.mism . Whether thi s can be done after the turn of events of 196 8 
still remains in question, even though there should be no doubt as to t he 
po sition of the maj ority . 
The theologian Adalbert Hudak , then Profe s sor at the University of 
E rl a ngen, We st Germany ,  Christian-Sociali st member of the Bavarian 
Parl iament , later member of the Federal Parl iament , di scus sed the 
Ch risti an Peace Conference in numerous publ ications . In Hromadka 's 
theolog y, he detected 
a penetration of the Bolshevist conception of 
history into theological thinking , expres sed especi­
al ly in the new understanding of atheism, the 
biblical j ustification of socialist s��iety and the 
que stions of pe ace in a nuclear worl d .  
Bishop Otto Dibel i us ,  too , accused Hromadka of belittl ing the 
dangers of communism and the Federal Government of West Germany at first 
b elieved that a denial of visa could "keep away the supposed theological 
Troj an ho rse of the communi sts .  " 20 Also the Czechoslovak authorities had 
second t houghts about permitt ing Hromadka to leave the country . 
Martin Stobr thinks that Joseph Hromadka 's theology does not funda­
mentally contradict the socialist order of society. He was closer to 
so cialism than to the bourgeoi s  democracy . Communi sm ,  for him , was 
radical humanism as expres sed by the early Marx , and he was convinced 
that the human being would not let himsel f/hersel f  be manipulated . 
Already in 1 9 48 , he had designed a program of "sociali st humanism" 
in whi ch he demanded 
to put le s s  emphasis on violent methods of agita­
tion, threat s ,  propaganda , deportation , trials and 
po lice control but rather inspire the most noble 
fe el ings within humans such as sympathy for t he 
po or ,  the weak , the helple ss and the destitute .  
Man's eyes should be opened for that which repre­
sents the heart of socialist humanism . 
Stob r  interprets thi s as 
a warning of an anthropology whi ch considers man ex­
clusivel y the product of his social and economic en­
vi ronment , simi lar to the way in whi ch man in the 
West becomes a product of his society due to the 
free play of liberalistic forces .  
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. I  
Accordi ng to StOhr , the i nflue nce of the tradition of the Bohemian 
Bre thren on Hromadka 
made it impossible for him to follow any one of 
three ways out of the dilemma which might have 
preserved the church at the e xpe nse of its signifi­
cance in the history a nd the world : Firstly , the 
th eory of two worlds whi ch would leave the world to 
follow its own l aws a nd reduce the validity of the 
bibl ical message to the realm of the church . 
Secondly , the retreat to the realm of worship which 
pe rmitted islands of non-conf ormi st and free life i n  
a totally different world , both in terms of 
orga nizat ion a nd orie ntation. Fi nally , the insis­
tence on rights a nd areas �l freedom for the church 
to be gra nted by the state. 
From thi s point of view ,  Hromadka ' s theology was not o nly relevant 
for an ecumenical peace roveme nt but also for a basic conception of 
church , for social and political responsibi lity of Christians and finally 
for those who live in socialist countries . Those who deny the e xistence 
of Chri stians, or a "church i n  socialism" from the very begi nni ng ,  will 
find little stimulation in Hromadka ' s  cons iderations . 
Exactly these basic convictions occasioned the first CPC preside nt ' s  
support for the experiments of the Prague Spring . He closed his 
pa ssionate memorandum titled " Save Huma nkind .  Peace is Possibl e "  at the 
I I Ird Al l-Christian Peace Assembly with the following words which, 
al though they did not mention a concrete situation, had to be understood 
by everybody : 
We are i n  the midst of a current of events which has 
c aused the formation of centers of political power 
and mil itary rule. But every day a n  i ncreasing 
degree of differentiation in regional conditions , 
cultural traditions , political convictions ,  social 
progress ,  scientific a nd technological developme nt 
oc curs . . . . The social a nd political questions 
cannot be solved through the i nfluence and the 
pressure of the big powers.  Eve n  the three centers 
of i nternational politics ,  of which I have spoken, 
are unable to domi nate the nations in terms of power 
politics a nd mil itarily , economical ly , or politi­
ca lly are unable to force onto them their model of a 
f uture society . Even if these states would come to 
terms with each other ( somethi ng that cannot be 
e xpected in the near future) , they could not force 
the s�ler and smallest nations to submit to their 
pl ans .  
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Hromadka ' s  plea for th e right of s elf-det erminat ion, hi s c laim to be 
Christ ian in the world in which one lives , n either pio us ly loyal to the 
st at e nor (necessarily)  anti-socia list, had brought about his pos itive 
attit ude towards soc ia lism in Cz echos lovak ia, b ut this sympathy was 
neither und ivided nor uncond itiona l. And this is why , in th e co urse of 
the events of 1968 , he recogniz ed that soc ia lism could a lso become a 
"monolithic sys t em of power" in which the stat e and th e f ight for power 
would no longer take into account the int er ests of h uman individua ls . 
OUr pe ople have att empted a synthes is b etween true 
soc ia lism ,  true personal fr eedom and c ultural 
maturity . If it should be stopped on th e way to 
a chiev ing this goa l, a skept ical, cyn ical, apath et ic 
and irrespons ible mood wo uld ensue or reappear . 
Anoth er generat ion of yo ung peop le would become the 
victim of a feeling of helplessn ess suggesting that 
any in it iat ive or progress on the part of ��e weak 
results in vio lent punishment by the strong . 
The Cardinal Q uestion : A Movement Beyond Blocs ?  
The mi litary intervent ion in Cz echos lovak ia was j ustif ied by the 
so-ca lled Brezhn ev doctrine of th e " limited sovereignty " of socia list 
countries , an aggres s ive theory bas ed on the policy of "soc ia lism in one 
co untry " wh ich had been pract ic ed for years and wh ich c laimed that the 
build ing of soc ia lism had to be accompan ied by extensive s ec urity 
measur es aga inst th e out s ide world .  
Th e non- monolithic ideologica l  character of the CPC had invo lved 
this o rga nizat ion in the d isc uss ion c ent er ing aro und a h uman e, d emocrat ic 
form of socia lism. As a result ,  many members of th e organizat ion 
questioned the acc eptability of the concept of "peacef ul coex istence" as 
pract iced by the US SR. 
A lr eady in 196 8 ,  Aaron Tolen (cameroon) , member of the Int ernat iona l 
Secreta ria t ,  had writt en a lett er to Jaros lav Ondra in ord er to spec ify 
his position taken aga inst th e military int ervention : 
It is a ltogether impossible that we sanction an 
action whose on ly j ustif ication is the def ense of 
' bloc ' int er ests or certain sph eres of inf luence. If 
we approve of s uch mea s ures taken by the East,  we 
ar e no longer q ua lif ied to condemn them with regard 
to the Wes t .  If we agree to the int ervention in 
Cz echos lovak ia we are no longer in a pos ition to 
c ondemn the in�fvent ions in the Domin ican Republic 
and in V ietnam . 
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This warning of a bloc-related philosophy corre sponded to the 
support of " socialism with a human face" and the rej ection of the 
authorita rian style of leadership practiced by Metropolitan Nikodim whi ch 
incorporated Soviet interests into the organizational structure of the 
CPC . 
I 
Th e entry of representatives of the Thi rd World into the ranks of 
the orga nization and the concern with questions dealing with revolution 
and liberation in these countri es already several years prior to 1968 had 
resulted in a dec ided support of national revolutions in the individual 
departments of the organization . The leadership became increasingly 
distrustful especially against the Youth Commission .  
Th e  views that had developed i n  that commi ssion corresponded to 
those of the Western youth , .student and protest movements of the sixties ; 
a strong stand was taken against bureaucratic repression of any kind and 
support was given to a derrocratic proces s  with the participation of all 
individual human beings . 
Consequently , thi s commi ssion wa s the one to condemn Soviet inter­
vention of 1968 most forceful ly . Some went so far as to dis tance 
th emsel ves from " capitalist and communist imperialism" following the 
s chism and declaring their loss of faith in either group . Peaceful 
coexistence for some members of the committee meant "the attempt at 
global domination by the two superpowers" and they rej ected the fact that 
thi s  phi losophy should be the only basis of the CPc . 25 
The French R egional Committee,  too , declared in their letter to 
Metropolitan Nikodim following their expu lsion that they were against the 
acceptance of the status quo in the sense of a division of the world in 
spheres of interest and that thi s could not be the meaning of peaceful 
coexistenc e .  Shortly before , the new general secretary Janusz Makowski 
(Poland )  had addressed Georges ca salis and other French members and 
re j ected the definition of coexistence as an instrument of a "pax 
rus so-ameri cana" a s  an " ultrarevolut ionary s logan . " 
Furthermore , Makowski had left no doubt that the preservation of 
pe ace had to be ti ed to the acceptance of the political and military 
blocs a s  well as necessary "corrections" within those blocks : "The even ts 
of the year 196 8 di d not stop the process of detente. Possibly,  they even 
contribut ed to it . n 26 
- 32 -
Thi s just served to confirm the c ritics ' fea rs and it defined t he 
cour se of East-West policies whi ch have essentially remained the same 
until the present day . 
The Present-Day Crisis of the CPC 
Fol lowing the break , CPC policy was oriented towards the consolida­
tion of its political cours e .  It undertook great efforts to compensate 
the loss of Western Regional Commi ttees and members through an 
intensification of its contacts to other organizations working on a 
transnational basis.  But thi s just confirmed its isol ation and its 
o rientation towards the East as both the "Berlin Conference of European 
catholics" as wel l  as the "World Peace Council "  are known for their 
relatively uncritical acceptance of Eastern European security politics. 
Ever since the IVth ACPA ( September 30-0ctober 3 ,  1971) , there has 
been an increased number of activities everywhere in Eastern Europe 
at tempting to consolida te Ch ristians and Churches from socialist 
countri e s .  Numerous representatives of churches appeared at the World 
COngress of Peace Forces organized by the World Peace Council in Moscow 
in 19 73 .  At times ,  church representatives were part of individual 
na tional organizations.  Th i s  wa s true in the case of the delegation from 
the GDR Peace Council , where three of the 53 delegates were offi cial 
representatives of the Evangel ical Alliance of Churches of the GDR . 
In the past years , s imilar international meetings were held at dif­
ferent locations in socialist countries, sometimes with strong church 
r epresentations.  Sometimes these were assemblies solely composed of 
rel igious representatives ( 197 7,  1982)  • The CPC ' s contribution to such 
conferences was rather significant.  Although such meetings were also 
at tended by participants , gue sts and observers who held different points 
of vi ew ,  differences of opinion have rarely become public knowledge . 
Also, i nternational church bodies had oftentimes limited their participa­
tion by as suming observer status. 
Fol lowing the IVth ACPA , the CPC increasingly attempted to restruc­
ture its work according to regional considerations which also resulted in 
a restru cturi ng of the organization . 
Apa rt from the Regional Commi ttees,  continental CPCs were founded in 
Afric a ,  Asi a  and Latin Ame rica.  However ,  they are still directly 
- 33 -
respons ible to the central organization . 
At the IVth ACPA , Metropolitan Nikodim was appointed president and 
Karoly T6th , bishop of the Hungarian Reformed Church , became general 
secretary . At the Vth ACPA (June 22-2 7 ,  1978 ) , Toth was elected as 
pres ident and he is still in office today . The Czechoslovak mini ster 
Lubomir Mirejovsky became General Secretary and Metropolitan Filaret 
�iev) became the new chairman of the CCW . 
In the course of the Vth ACPA , a hesitant opening occurred , but 
without an attempt to summa rize and come to terms with the events of the 
pa st ten years . The years of cri sis were also excluded from the 
historical account of the development and the function of the organiza­
tion given in the report of the president. Nevertheless,  it wa s the first 
time that those like-minded individuals who had been expelled ten years 
earl ier,  were invited and came--for the most part as guests.  However , it 
was hardly more than a ges ture of protocol . 
The attempt at broadening its orientation resulted in a number of 
questions and problems on the agenda with which the CPC had to de al in 
the years following . On some points ( su ch as peace and the Third World) 
there was some progres s ,  others still point to the ongoing crisis of the 
organization . The following three problem areas serve to demonstrate this 
cris is : 
1 )  The challenge by the Third Worl d ,  the problems of hunger as wel l  as 
political and economic injustic e ,  mostly caused by the industrial 
nations, had to receive more attention as part of a comprehensive work 
for peace.  The East-West conflict which is not confined to ideology and 
in whi ch wealthy industri al powe rs play the role of contestants,  will no 
longer automatically be in the foreground . Following the Vth ACPA, 
CPC-experts pred icted that the role of Ch ri stians from Western industri­
alized nations 
will not be mo re but le ss significant in the future 
This is a natural result of the general 
ecumenical developnent and 2feflects the priori ties in today ' s  global problems . 
Thi s challenge can be best demonstrated by the fact that there were 
two resol utions calling for disarmament : one relating to Europe and 
another to the problem of developnent . The main report was given by a 
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vice pres ident from the Third World , a second report by the vi ce 
pre sident from the Federal Republ ic of Germany , Herbert Mochalski , who 
presen t ed  the CSCE proces s as a model for the solution of international 
conf licts in the Third World and other regions in the world .  
Apart from maintaining a representation i n  Third World countries 
( especially Africa) the CPC tri es to answer this challenge by intensify­
i ng i t s  work in the World Council of Churche s .  At the General Assembly of 
the World Council in Vancouver in 198 3 ,  the CPC introduced a resolution 
of its own stress ing the connections between hunger,  j ustice and peace . 
Alt hough differences of opinion between the CPC and the wee are numerous , 
the CPC refrains from publ ic polemics . Instead ,  it supports the programs 
and attempts to improve contacts through regular consultations.  
The work of the CPC at the U . N .  and her organizations is not without 
importance. As one of 50 0 Non-Governmental Organizations , of which only 
1 0  percent participate actively in the work of the U . N . , the CPC wields 
some influence , especially since its orientation does not di ffer from 
that of the Russian Orthodox Church , another Non-Governmental Organiza­
ti on . But its work withi n the U . N .  is also the result of an experience 
whi ch Bishop T6th formulated as follows : Churches are always part of the 
central systems of communication. I n  the end , thi s consideration should 
also be interesting to other Churches in Eastern Europe or the GDR , who 
vi ew their ecumenical work a s  part of their international work for peace . 
One of the f uture questions will be whether or not the turn of the CPC 
towards the Third World wil l  be one-s ided and follow the course and 
interests of the sociali st countries.  
2) At the G eneral Assembl y in 1978 , Bishop T6th stated in vague terms 
that the CPC ' s  j udgment of socialism in the Eastern European countries is 
not necessarily the same for each country . ( It had always been stressed 
that a pro-socialist orientation was not a requirement for working within 
the orga nization, especially since thi s could not be a theological ( ! )  
topi c .  However ,  the events of 1 9 68 showed a clear pol itical decision . )  
Th e  pr esence of " di ssenting " participants from the ACPA was also an 
expression of the new strategy of alliances . Toth himself recently stated 
that a policy of alliances is more important than ideology . 28 
Properly understo od ,  this statement may have significant importance 
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for the future of the CPC . As a result of this pol icy , for example , the 
Waldensian Professor Paolo Ricca ( Rome) was able to present a commentary 
on the report of the Theological Committee which reflected eurocommuni st 
thought. (Although thi s commentary wa s not included in the volume 
documenting the meeting , certain rather innocuous aspects from the 
di scus sion of the commentary were included in the report of the' working 
group . ) 29 Ricca posed a crucial question, namely whether the CPC politics 
is the soil required for the growth of theology or whether it is the 
other way around . 
At least for the present , the formulation of a policy of alliances 
must be seen as a declaration of intent. For the near future , the CPC has 
left no doubt that it advocates al liances with a narrow political 
spectrum whi ch does not significantly differ from that of the governmen ts 
in the socialist countrie s :  
The devel opnent o f  the Non-Aligned Movement since 
196 1 ,  presently compn.s�ng almost one hundred 
countries, has successfully counteracted this policy 
[ of NATO countri e s ,  D . U . ] ,  as have the increased 
mi litary power of the warsaw Pact system and t�cr 
growing peace movements in many Western countries .  
Church-inspired peace initiatives in the GDR called "peace move­
ments" in the West are not mentioned by the CPC . Rather , the official 
line of a "uniform peace movement" in socialist countries is repeated : 
In socialist countries, there is a peace movement as 
well , but it has developed under different condi­
ti ons and has to deal with different governments-
The partner they are addressing is--as 
opposed to the capitalist countries--their own 
government whi ch is trying to carry their mission of 
pe ace into international politics . . . There are no 
Obj ective grounds for a contradiction between a 
pe ace movement supporting the policies of peace of 
the government of its country and a peace moveme nt 
re sisting the pe ace-threatening policies of the 
governments of their countries . . . Therefore , we 
should not develop a str�iegy which might be 
applicable to all situations. 
The CPC will not accept ethically radical Christians as long as it 
is not willing to take up the ethi cally motivated political arguments of 
earlier years criti cizing military logic and systems of weapons of ma ss 
de struction also within its own sphere of influence . This fact, and its 
s i lent support of armament of the Warsaw Pact countries will not lend 
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credibil ity to the CPC among the Western peace movement s .  ( In this 
connection, it might be only fair to admi t that the shift to the Third 
World did not occur prima rily on the grounds of prophecy , but that it was 
caus ed by the irrecoverable loss of Western partners . )  
In this connection , the position of German CPC-membe rs should also 
be mentioned . When thousands of members in the Evangel ical Churches in 
the GDR cal led for the introduction of a Social Peace Service [ as an 
al ternative to the military service , the translation ] , the CPC was quick 
in its attempt to prove itself as an ( internal church) critic of such 
na ive pacifism .  At the same time wh en the GDR youth were harrassed 
bec ause of their sticker "Beat Swords into Plowshares " ( according to 
Bishop Hempel "an error with symbolic signi ficance" ) ,  a meeting of the 
CPC of the GDR with the CPC of West Berl in took place.  All the 
pa rticipants of thi s meeting came up with what was a warning not to use 
the B ible as a weapon in the political struggle or to demand unilateral 
di sarmament on the part of the socialist countrie s .  As a consequence , 
Dorothee Sel le criticiz ed  the CPC-working group by saying that those who 
understand theology as work for liberation would have to accept the Bible 
32 as the mo st important weapon in the struggle for pe ace . 
3 )  Paolo Ricca ' s  demand to review the rel ationship between politics and 
theology is at the heart of the present-day cris i s .  The problem is not 
j us t  the policy formulated by the CPC but also the tensions between the 
general formulation of theological statements and concrete proposals for 
po litical action . 
It is not difficult to describe the politics of the CPC above and 
beyond that whi ch has a lready been said . It becomes especially clear when 
looking at its position on the NATO decision on the deployment of 
medium-range missiles in Europe and the ensuing deployment of more 
mi s sile s  by the Warsaw pact and the proposals for new security politics . 
At the meeting of the Working Committee in March 1982 as well as on 
other occasions, there wa s an unequivocal rej ection of the Brus sel s  
resol ution by NATO . Fol lowing the introduction of new weapons systems , 
the development of the neut ron weapon and new strategies of warfare , the 
CPC has reiterated its rej ection of nuclear weapons . In this case , it was 
rel atively easy to identify "Western impe rialism" as the principal enemy , 
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esp3cially since the U . s . developed new weapons technical ly lowering the 
nu clear threshold and her ruling political el ite theori zed about a 
"winnable nuc lear war . "  This unequivocal and one-s ided position by the 
CPC wa s favored by the fact that , for the first time since the foundation 
of the organization, mass movements in Western European countries 
protested against the same mi litary and strategic plans and against the 
same weapons as the CPC itself . 
But whi le large segments of the Western peace movements have since 
started to criticize the threat coming from a security pol icy based on 
weapons of mass destruction from both sides , the CPC still criticizes the 
u . s .  as solely respons ible for the arms race , but has not criticized the 
weapens systems of the Warsaw pact countries. 
Concerning international-regional conflicts such as Afghanistan , the 
CPC position remains unchanged from 196 8 :  "Protection is necessary , even 
though it would be desirable that Soviet troops were removed . "  But this 
is only possible if there i s  a gua rantee that there are no " subversive 
actions of interference from abroad . " And while the s trong guerilla 
movement in Afghanistan already forces the Soviet leadership to make 
s emi-publ ic statements concerning thoughts of a possible troop with­
drawa l ,  a CPC-minister in West Berl in stil l  maintains that the stationing 
o f  Russian troops is necessary in order to prevent massacres among the 
native population ! 
Concerning the deployment of new mi s sile s by Warsaw Pac t  countries, 
the stationing of new nuclear weapons in the GDR and the CSSR , the CPC of 
the GDR has already released a statement whi ch will probably reflect the 
l ine of the organization of a whole . 
We are deeply concerned , but we will have to have 
understanding when the Soviet Union and her al lies 
introduce mi litary counter-measures in view of the 
beginning of the stationing of nuclear weapons in 
Western Europe . Given the hi stori cal experience 
gained so far ,  a one-s ided fall ing behi�� would not 
further but endanger the caus e of peace . 
This is not the first time that the GDR regional conference proved 
to be especially " true to the line . " On the other hand , the regional con­
ference of the GDR approved the WCC declaration of Vancouver banning the 
weapons of mass destruction (with four votes against and six absten-
. ) 34 t� ons . 
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Even if the CPC ana lyzes the rearmament of the USSR as a reaction to 
that of the West, the question would remain, if they were to stay with 
the old principles ,  whether the rearmament is politically necessary and 
ac ceptable from a Christian point of view .  There are no clear positions 
taken in thi s respec t .  Instead ,  the CPC is hiding behind obj ectively 
ne cessary processes of action and reaction for which they must show 
"understarrling . "  
Thi s also pe rmits the support of new political concepts such a s  that 
of the security partnership designed by the Palme Commission in which 
Ea stern and Western disarmament specialists participated .  Thi s concept 
was not only put into more concrete terms by the Swedish government , but 
al so accepted , in its essentials ,  by the churches and the government of 
the GDR, by the (We s t) German Social-Democratic Party and by the CPC . As 
long as it seems clear who is responsible for international tensions , 
conc epts can be de signed whi ch might pos s ibly never become realizable 
goals.  Thi s includes the creation of nuclear-free zones , the abolishment 
of all military alliance s ,  irrlustrial conversion ( change from military , 
industri al production to the production of goods used only for pe aceful 
pu:rpos es) , education , especially of youth , according to a philosophy of 
35 pe ace and di sarmament , etc. 
For the CPC " unde rstanding " for present-day rearmanent processes 
means to leave the legacy of the founding fathers and to identify with a 
mi litary-political concept based on the "balance of terror . "  Whether thi s 
is presented as a historically necessary experience in the course of the 
bui lding of socialism do es not make much difference . The thoughts of 
Heinri ch Vogel , which were diametrically opposed to this attitude , were 
not only presented in 195 8  at the foundation of the CPC , but also one 
year late r ,  because of the large maj ority of the founders of the CPC 
identified with it ! 
Still , there have been a few _ interesting nuances in recent times : At 
the we-meeting in 1 98 2 , Bishop Toth dealt with the doctrines of military 
policy and wrote shortly aft erwards : 
The states jus tify the incomprehensible arms race 
with their cl aim to national security . But this 
cl aim changed into the opposite--as a result of the 
threat originat ing from the weapons of mass destruc­
ti on . The aspiration for greatest possible securi ty 
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has led to the greatest poss ible insecurity experi­
en ced so fa r .  Thi s absurd situation clarifies the 
mean ing of national security : only military points 
of view dealing with defen se against external 
dangers are cons idered ;  other , similarly important 
questions of securi ty such as economic security , 
participation in political decision-making , etc . a re 
negle cted . The basic ethi cal que stion of today i s :  
Is i t  poss ible to guarantee the security of the 
pe oples ,  i . e .  the preservation of world peace with 
weapons of mass destruction? 
Here we have to deal with the strategy of deter­
rence--the ' equilibrium of terro r ' --which is the 
foundation of the relevant security systems today . 
The deterrence theory does not view nuclear weapons 
as instruments de signed for warfa re. Rather , they 
should serve , as it is termed , as a means of threat, 
in order to keep the other side from using simi l ar 
weapon systems . This threat ,  however ,  is only 
credible , if there is no doubt concerning the 
intention of an actual use of these weapons . It is 
thi s policy of deterrence whi ch caus es the never­
ending arms race--at the cost of a clear picture of 
ba lance of powe r with regard to the other side . 
Peace maintained by deterrence is nothing but a 
pe ace of terror and the symbiosis of violence and 
fea r .  Therefore , theology is j ustif ied in question­
ing the ethi cal grounds of deterrence and in 
declaring that the security of mankind cannot be 
founded in instruments , whi ch enda�r continuing 
existence of the creation as a whole.  
It remains to be seen whether or not the CPC in Prague wil l  take a 
stand against the stationing of nuclear short and medium-range weapons in 
the CS SR and the GDR . 
Th e  Evangel ical Churches of the GDR have taken an unequivocal stand . 
Especially at a time when the nuclear super powers start to manufacture 
" small"  nuclear weapons for mi litary us e ,  thi s should be a warning that 
those who have the nuclear potential at their disposal also hope to 
remain spared from the enemy ' s  potential , that they are trying to create 
a cordon sanitaire effectively lowering the nuclear threshold . From the 
po int of view of the CPC ' s  original phi losophy , criticism would have to 
be elementary and not just start at the overkill-potential . This is on ly 
po ssible from a theologi cal-ethi cal point of view . It remains doubtful 
whether the theology will be the ground from which the policies of the 
CPC will grow (as Ricca wondered ) .  
But there are sign s for a return to theological considerations, 
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especially under the present president ,  Karoly Toth. On the occasion of 
the 2 5th anniversary , Toth publ i shed an essay titled "Dis armament as a 
'lheo l ogical Problem" in whi ch he referred to its relationship with 
ideologie s :  
Frequentl y ,  ideological differences are misused as 
apologetic pretense for the continued escalation of 
conflict s .  One of the central que stions which must 
be asked by the churches and by Christian theology 
is that concerning the possibi lity of overcoming the 
ideological barriers in order to cooperate on 
concrete steps towards di sarmament. At thi s point, 
we would also have to deal with the problem of enemy 
profile s ,  and the us e of ideologi cal positions or 
anti-positions in order to j ustify the arms race 
would also have to be que stioned . Therefore , the 
aspiration towards disarmament should cause Chris­
ti an theology to modi fy the importance of ideologies 
and in those cas e s ,  where ideologies are usef ul ,  
state di stinctly and cJrarly whi ch real needs are 
expressed through them . 
Thi s hesitant attempt at a return to theology and ethical radicalism 
is due also to the fact that the CPC feels confirmed and encouraged by 
po sitions taken by churches in the West ( status confessionis of the 
R eformed Church , pastoral letters by catholic bishops , etc . ) .  
To a significant degr ee future developments will depend on the ques­
tion o f  whether or not the CPC will find more response among partners in 
the West than it has so fa r ,  some of whom have only recently come to 
condemn weapons of mass destruction in a way the CPC had done many years 
ea rl ier. Whether thi s is finally going to lead to intensified contacts 
wil l  depend on the CPC itself . There is a pos sibility , though the 
probabi lity is small . 
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